yes, therapy helps!
Philosophical zombies: a mental experiment about consciousness

Philosophical zombies: a mental experiment about consciousness

March 1, 2024

The philosophical zombies are a mental experiment performed by the Australian philosopher David Chalmers to question materialistic explanations about the functioning and complexity of consciousness.

Through this experiment, Chalmers argues that it is not possible to understand consciousness by means of the physical properties of the brain, which can be argued if we imagine a world like ours, but inhabited by zombies.

  • Related article: "The Chinese room experiment: computers with minds?"

Mental experiment of philosophical zombies: some background

Describing and locating the components of consciousness is a subject that has generated not only scientific and philosophical debates that constantly update the classic discussion about the mind-body relationship , but it has even led us to imagine worlds in which it is impossible to discern between who is human and who is not, as shown by science fiction or the development of artificial intelligence.


There are those who defend that our conscience is nothing more than a set of material elements that can be found inside the brain. In contrast, there are those who argue in favor of the existence of mental states and subjective experiences, that although they have organic substrates, it is not possible to define solely based on biologicist or physicalist explanations.

Both theses have been defended and refuted by different means. One of them is mental experiments, tools used in philosophy to pose hypothetical situations that allow you to imagine the logical results of an experiment , and based on this, draw conclusions and argue theoretical positions.


In the decade of the 90's and with the intention of questioning the materialist explanations about the functioning of the human mind, David Chalmers made a mental experiment published in his book The conscious mind, in which he suggests that if materialistic explanations about mental states were valid , then we humans would not be more than a bunch of zombies.

With his thesis, the idea of ​​philosophical zombies was popularized in an important sector of philosophy, however, David Chalmers was not the only one interested in discussing the properties of human experience through its comparison with pseudo-human characters.

  • You may be interested: "The Molyneux Problem: a curious mental experiment"

Why are not zombies human beings?

The mental experiment of the philosophical zombies is developed in the following way: suppose there is a world that is physically identical to ours, but instead of being populated by human beings, it is populated by zombies.


Zombies are physically equal beings to humans, they can learn the same behaviors and have the same cognitive functions . But there is a difference that is fundamental and that defends that it is not possible to explain consciousness by the mere existence of physical components: although zombies have a physical composition identical to that of human beings, they have no conscious and subjective experiences (elements called " qualia "within philosophy), with which, they do not feel, and neither can they develop a consciousness of" being "(a zombie). For example, zombies can scream like people, but they do not have the subjective experience of pain.

From this experiment, Chalmers concludes that consciousness can not be explained in terms of a biological determinism , so the proposals of materialism are inadequate. It concludes that zombies are conceivable insofar as it is possible to imagine them, and if they are conceivable it is because their conditions of existence are not determined only by physical properties, with which, physicalist explanations about the existence of consciousness are also inadequate.

  • Related article: "Dualism in Psychology"

Chalmers' double-aspect monism

The experiment of the philosophical zombies is an attempt to answer a question that is held in the mind-brain dilemma: Can a physical system develop conscious experiences?

What this experiment supposes is that consciousness is not identical to a physical fact, and vice versa, a physical fact does not fully explain consciousness, because it can not fully explain the presence of qualitative and subjective experiences.

That is to say, that the explanations that start from the physical or materialistic theory are not enough to explain the world, because the world is not only composed of physical properties but of subjective experiences that are phenomenal properties.

In fact, the mental experiment of philosophical zombies is usually inscribed in the set of arguments in favor of double-aspect monism, also known as property dualism , philosophical current that very broadly maintains that consciousness is not an entity that exists apart from the physical world, but at the same time, conscious or subjective experience (phenomenal properties) exist beyond physical properties.

Bibliographic references:

  • Chiarella, H. (2015). Limits and possibilities of a science of consciousness. Synthesis. articles based on degree theses, 6: 63-81.
  • Bocci, L. (2005). How to stop being a zombie: a strategy to maintain materialism despite Chalmers. Journal of Philosophy and Political Theory, Annex 2005: 1-11.
  • Gojlik, B., Oukacha, B., Dumitrache, C. & Sánchez, P. (S / A). David Chalmers Retrieved April 23, 2018. Available at //www.ugr.es/~setchift/docs/cualia/david_chalmers.pdf

Philosophical Zombies (Thought Experiment) (March 2024).


Similar Articles